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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--CREDITOR-DEBTOR LAW: PROCEDURAL DuE
PROCESS AND WASHINGTON'S PREJUDGMENT SEIZURE PROCEDURES-
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
A recent United States Supreme Court decision, Fuentes v. Shevin,'
and two recent Washington Court of Appeals decisions, Lucas v.
Stapp2 and Seattle Credit Bureau v. Hibbitt,3 held that except in ex-
traordinary situations the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution requires notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before any significant property interest can be
seized by actions involving government officials. 4 Under these cases,
Washington's attachment, 5 garnishment, 6 and replevin 7 statutes ap-
pear to be unconstitutional insofar as they provide for prejudgment
seizure of a defendant's property without prior notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard.8 This note will analyze the impact of the recent
due process decisions on Washington's attachment, garnishment, and
replevin statutes and discuss possible legislative solutions to the due
process requirements.9
1. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
2. 6 Wn. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972).
3. 7 Wn. App. 219, 499 P.2d 92 (1972).
"4. The pertinent provision of the federal constitution reads: "[N] or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The two Washington Court of Appeals cases also relied upon
a parallel provision in the Washington State Constitution: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
5. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.12.010-.330 (1959).
6. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.33.010-.390 (Supp. 1972).
7. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.64.010-.110 (1959).
8. For purposes of this note, "seizure" should be interpreted to include attachment,
garnishment, and replevin of property. As a practical matter, most property involved in
prejudgment seizures is personal property, which is attached or replevied by having the
sheriff take it into his possession. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.12.130(2), 7.64.030 (1959). Per-
sonal property is garnished by serving a writ of garnishment upon a third party ordering
that property which is held by the third party and owned by or owed to the defendant be
delivered to the court, if no judgment has been issued, or to the plaintiff, ifjudgment has
been entered. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.33.210 (Supp. 1972). Real property is attached by
sending notice to the county auditor for inclusion in the recording index. WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.12.130(1) (1959).
9. A discussion of the due process attack on the constitutionality of the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) "self-help" repossession provisions, §§ 9-503 and 9-504, is
beyond the scope of this note. The central issue is whether a private repossession in-
volves sufficient state action to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The federal district courts which have decided the issue thus far have split. Com-
pare Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Calif. 1972), appeal docketed, No.
72-1484, 9th Cir., 1972, (Held: Sufficient state action and the UCC provisions are un-
constitutional) with Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Calif. 1972), ap-
peal docketed, No. 72-1888, 9th Cir., 1972, (Held: No state action present and therefore
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I. BACKGROUND
Prejudgment attachment, garnishment, and replevin procedures in
Washington are supplemental in nature; a plaintiff using these pre-
judgment procedures first must have filed a suit seeking judgment on
an underlying debt.10 To obtain a prejudgment writ after initiating
suit against the defendant, a plaintiff must file an affidavit stating in
conclusory fashion that the requirements of the- particular statute are
met 1 and must post a security bond for at least double the alleged
value of the property.' 2 On the basis of the affidavit and bond, the
clerk of the court where the underlying suit has been filed issues the
prejudgment writ. Presently there is no provision for notice and an
opportunity for the defendant to contest issuance of the writ. The pre-
judgment writ directs a local law enforcement officer to levy on a de-
fendant's property, in some instances permitting the officer to break
into a locked home or building to take possession of the property. 13
After seizure, the property is either held by the sheriff pending the
outcome of the suit,14 sold at an execution sale (if the property is per-
ishable)15 or turned over to the plaintiff after seventy two hours have
elapsed (if the property was replevied).16
no jurisdiction to determine constitutionality); Greene v. First Nat'l Exchange Bank,
348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972) (Held: Passive state action only, which does not vio-
late the due process clause); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972) (Held:
Private repossessions not actions made "under color of" state law, so no violation of
due process).
A holding that the UCC repossession provisions are unconstitutional will have a much
broader impact than Fuentes, because private repossessions are far more prevalent thanjudicial repossessions.
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.010, 7.64.010 (1959); § 7.33.010 (Supp. 1972). Dis-
missal of the underlying suit means automatic termination of the prejudgment writ.
11. The specific statutory requirements for the required affidavits are not difficult to
meet. See WASH. REV. CODE 88 7.12.010-.020, 7.64.010-.020 (1959); § 7.33.010
(Supp. 1972).
12. See WASH. REV. CODE 88 7.12.060, 7.64.030 (1959); § 7.33.030 (Supp. 1972).
13. Washington's replevin statute provides:
If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the
sheriff shall publicly demand its delivery. If it be not delivered, he shall cause the
building or enclosure to be broken open and take the property into his possession,
and if necessary, he may call to his aid the power of his county.
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.64.080 (1959). Washington's attachment and garnishment statutes
contain no similar express authorization.
14. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.170 (1959).
15. Id. § 7.12.160.
16. In a prejudgment replevin action, if the defendant does not post a redelivery
bond within seventy-two hours, the property is turned over to the plaintiff. Id. § 7.64.050.
See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
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Stated simply, the purpose of prejudgment seizure proceedings is to
enable a plaintiff to seize a defendant's property prior to entry of
judgment against him. Creditors utilize prejudgment seizure proce-
dures for a number of reasons, including: (1) to obtain security with
which to satisfy the future judgment, (2) to guarantee that the de-
fendant will neither abscond nor further damage or devaluate the
property through continued use, (3) to defeat a claim to the property
by the trustee in bankruptcy,1 7 and (4) to obtain leverage over a de-
fendant so that he will be less likely to defend the principal suit.
While recent statutory amendments have limited the availability of
prejudgment wage garnishments,' 8 debtors continue to have only lim-
ited protection against unbridled use of other prejudgment seizure
procedures. Although a defendant debtor whose property is seized
pursuant to a prejudgment writ may regain possession immediately by
posting a redelivery bond, 19 the defendant who lacks the financial re-
sources to post the bond is forced to wait until the underlying suit on
the merits is decided. If he prevails in the underlying suit, he may
demand the return of the property and perhaps recover damages for
wrongful garnishment or attachment, though it is less likely that he
will receive damages for wrongful attachment.2 0 In practice, regard-
less of the merits of his case, a defendant who has his property seized
17. In Washington, a creditor who attaches or replevies property prior to judgment
is deemed to have acquired a lien as of the date of levy. Sheppard v. Guister, 10 Wash.
41, 44, 38 P. 759, 760 (1894); Van DeVanter v. Davis, 23 Wash. 693, 698-700, 63 P.
555, 566-67 (1901). If the attachment was levied more than four months before the filing
of the bankruptcy petition, the creditor can defeat a trustee's contention that the lien is a
voidable preference under sections 60(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, I 1 U.S.C. §§
96(a) and (b) (1970), even though judgment was rendered within four months of bank-
ruptcy.
18. In 1969 Washington's garnishment statute was amended to limit the use of pre-
judgment garnishment of wages. See WASH REV. CODE § 7.33.010(2) (Supp. 1972). These
amendments were completed prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). A discussion of the constitu-
tionality of the amended statute in light of Sniadach can be found in 46 WASH. L. REV.
423, 427-34 (1971). The note concludes that the statute probably is unconstitutionally
broad, but observes that "[t] he 1969 Act, not adequately rigorous on its face, is being
interpreted quite narrowly," and that prejudgment wage garnishment may have become
a thing of the past in Washington. Id. at 433.
19. The amount of the bond depends upon the nature of the prejudgment writ. See
WASH REV. CODE § 7.64.050 (1959) (Prejudgment replevin: defendant must post a bond
for twice the alleged value of the property in dispute); § 7.12.250 (1959), § 7.33.170
(Supp. 1972) (Prejudgment attachment and garnishment: defendant must post a bond
"to the effect that he will perform the judgment of the court.").
20. As a practical matter, it is much easier for a defendant to recover damages for
wrongful garnishment than it is for wrongful attachment.
The extraordinary advantage afforded a creditor by the garnishment statutes is a
648
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upon the filing of suit against him may of necessity be forced to re-
place the property and may choose quite rationally not to pursue the
defense of the suit because of the expense involved.21
II. PREJUDGMENT SEIZURES OF PROPERTY
INVOLVING STATE ACTION
The landmark due process decision in the creditor-debtor area is
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,2 2 which held that a Wisconsin
statute authorizing prejudgment garnishment of wages violated the
due process clause because it authorized a taking of property without
notice and an opportunity for a prior hearing.23 The language in Snia-
dach, especially that discussing the type of "property" subject to due
process protections before seizure, made the scope of the holding
ambiguous.24 While some post-Sniadach decisions interpreted the
holding narrowly by reasoning that Sniadach was limited solely to
wage garnishments, a particularly odious form of collection, 25 other
harsh remedy. . . . But to recover damages for wrongful garnishment, a de-
fendant need not prove that the plaintiff lacked probable cause, as is required in the
case of an alleged wrongful attachment. . . . A garnishment is wrongful if the
plaintiff does not recover ajudgment against the defendant.
Huzzy v. Culbert Const. Co., 5 Wn. App. 581,584-85,489 P.2d 749, 752 (1971) (citations
omitted).
21. The courts have become increasingly conscious of the leverage a creditor ob-
tains through use of summary prejudgment seizure proceedings. The United States Su-
preme Court in Sniadach stated: "The leverage of the creditor on the wage earner is
enormous . . . . The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type
may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall." 395 U.S. at 341-42.
The California Supreme Court agreed, stating: "Because of the extreme hardships im-
posed by such deprivation, a debtor is under severe pressure to settle the creditor's claim
quickly, whether or not the claim is valid." Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. App. 3d
536, 561, 488 P.2d 13, 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. 702, 726 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924
(1972).
22. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
23. Sniadach has been widely noted. See, e.g., Note, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 942 (1970);
Note, 68 MICH. L. REV. 986 (1970). For a good discussion of the early uncertainties of
Sniadach and an accurate prediction as to its eventual reach, see Smith, Sniadach and
Summary Procedures: The Constitution Comes to the Marketplace, 5 IND. LEGAL F.
300, 305-313 (1972).
24. For example, Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Sniadach stated: "We deal
here with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our
economic system." 395 U.S. at 340. This reference to a "specialized type of property"
made it unclear whether the holding in Sniadach was to apply to all types or only to spe-
cialized types of property.
25. See e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Term-
plan, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969). Some commentators also
concluded that Sniadach was limited to wage garnishment. See, Note, 54 MINN. L. REV.
853, 860 (1970). For discussions of garnishment as a collection device, see Project,
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cases refused to limit the Sniadach reasoning to specified types of
property and held that due process requires notice and a hearing prior
to seizure of more generalized types of property.26
The dispute as to the scope of Sniadach has been resolved to a large
degree by Fuentes v. Shevin.27 Fuentes held that the Florida and
Pennsylvania replevin statutes, which authorized a sheriff to seize a
defendant's property upon ex parte application by a creditor without
notice to the debtor and without opportunity for a hearing, violated
the due process clause. 28 The Fuentes majority opinion, 29 written by
Justice Stewart, noted that historically procedural due process has
required notice and an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner. '30 Stressing the meaningful time require-
ment, the Court held that in order to serve its intended purpose, notice
Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1968);
Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 759.
26. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y.
1970); Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. App. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr.
702 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972). Many commentators also urged a
broad interpretation of Sniadach. See, e.g., Note, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 949-50
(1970); Smith, supra note 23, at 307-13.
27. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In the same opinion, the Supreme Court decided Parham v.
Cortese, a challenge to the Pennsylvania replevin statute.
28. The Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01 et seq. (Supp. 1972) is virtually
identical to the Washington replevin statute, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.64 (1959). The
Pennsylvania replevin statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1821-47 (1967), PA. R. Civ. P.
1071-86 (1967), differs from the Florida and Washington statutes in that it is not supple-
mental in nature. Because the procedures for obtaining a writ of replevin are satisfied
by ex parte proceedings with no notice to the defendant, the result in Pennsylvania was
that unless the defendant shouldered the burden of initiating a court proceeding to re-
cover the property, there was no opportunity for the defendant ever to have a hearing on
the merits.
29. The Fuentes Court was split, 4-3, with Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and
Marshall in the majority, and Chief Justice Burger along with Justices White and
Blackmun in the minority. What the result would have been if Justices Powell and
Rehnquist had been sitting on the Court is open to question. However, in Roofing
Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. 1972), the Arizona Supreme Court,
with two justices dissenting vigorously, refused to declare Arizona's prejudgment attach-
ment statute unconstitutional. Admitting that Fuentes compelled a finding of unconsti-
tutionality, the court stated: "When, however, we have doubts that once the full court
hears the case that the opinion will stand, we are reluctant to declare unconstitutional
Arizona statutes based upon a decision by less than a clear majority." Id. at 1329-30.
The Arizona court reasoned somewhat dubiously that a 4-3 decision was not a "clear
majority."
30. Fuentes quoted Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863) ("Parties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order to enjoy that right they must first
be notified.") and Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (The right to notice
and an opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a mean-
ingful manner."). 407 U.S. at 80.
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and a hearing must be granted before the seizure of property occurs.31
The Fuentes majority rejected the argument that requiring a plaintiff
to file an affidavit alleging entitlement to the property and to post bond
for twice the alleged value of the property was an adequate substitute
for "an informed evaluation by a neutral official" at a hearing.32
Of particular significance in Fuentes is the Court's careful clarifica-
tion of what property interests are entitled to due process protections.
Most of the plaintiffs in Fuentes were purchasers of household goods
under instillment sales contracts in which the seller retained a security
interest.33 The defendants contended that the plaintiffs did not have a
sufficient property interest to merit due process protections because
(1) the seller retained title to the personal property; (2) in theory at
least, the seizure of the goods in the replevin proceeding was only
temporary; and (3) the property involved was not a necessity of life.
Responding to the defendants' contentions, the Fuentes Court held
that the right to immediate possession and use of the property, ac-
quired by the purchaser in exchange for an agreement to pay a "ma-
jor" finance charge and periodic installment payments, constitutes a
property interest subject to due process protections without regard to
title.34 Relying on Sniadach and Bell v. Burson,3 5 the Court con-
31. Id. at 81. The Court based its holding on a long line of due process cases without
particular reliance on Sniadach. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 437 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950).
32. 407 U.S. at 83. The Court recognized in a footnote that as a practical matter, if
the creditor "knows that he is dealing with an uneducated, uninformed consumer with
little access to legal help and little familiarity with legal procedures, there may be a sub-
stantial possibility that a summary seizure of property-however unwarranted-may
go unchallenged, and the applicant may feel that he can act with impunity." Id. at 83 n.
13.
33. For example, plaintiff Fuentes had purchased a stove and stereo under an in-
stallment sales contract from defendant Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. For an
interesting and detailed account of the factual background by the attorneys who repre-
sented Ms. Fuentes, see Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal
Test Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57 IowA L. REv. 955 (1972).
34. 407 U.S. at 86-87. The Court relied on prior due process cases to establish that
the fourteenth amendment's protection of property applies to "any significant property
interest." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). In making it explicit that the
purchasers were deprived of a substantial property interest by losing the possession and
use of the goods, the Court relied on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sniadach,
395 U.S. at 342.
35. 402U.S. 535(1971).
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cluded that "it is now well settled that a temporary, nonfinal depriva-
tion of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 36 Resolving the pronounced split between the
lower courts,37 the Court held that the nature of the particular prop-
erty being seized was completely irrelevant to a determination of
whether due process applies. The Court explicitly rejected a narrow
reading of Sniadach and Goldberg v. Kelly,3 8 insisting that both deci-
sions were in the mainstream of past due process cases. 39 After briefly
tracing the origin of the "necessity of life" doctrine and reiterating
that this classification did not limit existing constitutional doctrine,40
the Fuentes Court closed its discussion by instructing lower courts to
extend due process protections to all types of property without inquiry
into whether the property is a necessity of life. 41
The Fuentes dissent, in an opinion by Justice White, did not agree
that purchasers under installment sales contracts have a sufficient
property interest to be entitled to full due process protections. Noting
that the buyer wants the use of the property pending final judgment
36. 407 U.S. at 84-85. The majority also rejected the argument that there was no
deprivation of property because of the ability of the defendant to reclaim possession of
the property by posting a bond for twice the alleged value of the goods. In a footnote the
Court noted the appellants' argument that very few, if any, defendants are in a position
to post a redelivery bond. 407 U.S. at 84-85 n.14. Moreover, the Court pointed out that
allowing a defendant to post a redelivery bond merely changes the type of the depriva-
tion of property. In the first case, the defendant is deprived of possession and use of par-
ticular goods; in the second, the defendant is deprived of the possession and use of the
money necessary to post the redelivery bond. In both of these situations, the deprivation
occurs without prior notice and hearing. Id. at 84.
37. The split between the lower courts arose from a narrow reading of Sniadach.
Some post-Snidach cases reasoned that due process protections were to be extended
only to necessities, or absolute necessities of life. See note 25 supra. Under this ap-
proach, the determination of whether the defendant was entitled to notice and a hearing
before seizure depended on the nature of the property and on the individual judge's view
of its relative necessity.
38. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg held that due process requires notice and a
hearing before welfare payments are terminated.
39. 407 U.S. at 88.
40. Id. at 89. The Fuentes Court acknowledged that Sniadach and Goldberg empha-
sized the special importance of wages and welfare benefits, and noted that Bell v. Bur-
son, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), had referred to a driver's license as an "important in-
terest."
41. TheCourt stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property" generally. And, under our free
enterprise system, an individual's choices in the marketplace are respected, how-
ever unwise they may seem to someone else. It is not the business of a court adjudi-
cating due process rights to make its own critical evaluation of those choices and
protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are "necessary."
407 U.S. at 90.
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while the seller seeks to prevent use and deterioration in the same time
period, the dissent concluded that a neutral seizure and immobiliza-
tion of the property is more equitable than permitting the buyer to
retain possession and use pending an adversary hearing. 42 The dissent
charged that the majority ignored the creditor's interest in the prop-
erty.43
More fundamentally, the dissent suggested that the practical impact
of the majority's holding would be negligible44 because creditors could
avoid a due process notice and hearing by including a carefully
worded waiver of the debtor's due process rights,45 or by including a
self-help repossession provision in the underlying contracts or security
agreements. 46 The dissent persuasively argued that even if notice is
given, the defendant often will waive the hearing or default com-
pletely; further, if a hearing is held, the creditor easily can establish
probable cause for the repossession. In its conclusion, the dissent ex-
pressed doubt that the majority's holding would result in substantial
new protections for the debtor and suggested that the availability of
credit might be diminished or the expense of securing it increased as a
result of the majority's holding.47
The Washington Court of Appeals reached a result similar to
42. Id. at 100.
43. Id. at 102. The majority met this argument by stating: "Procedural due process
is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is in-
tended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be
taken." Id. at 90 n.22.
44. "[T] he result it reaches will have little impact and represents no more than ide-
ological tinkering with state law." Id. at 102.
45. The Fuentes majority opinion briefly discussed the waiver problem but avoided
a decision because the waiver provision in the installment sales contract was not worded
clearly. It is apparent from the majority opinion that such a waiver would have to be
"'voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly' made." Id. at 94-95, quoting Overmyer v.
Frick, 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). While a waiver made by a large corporate purchaser
was upheld in Overmyer, dicta in both Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 182, and Fuentes, 407
U.S. at 94-95, casts considerable doubt on whether such a waiver of due process contrac-
tual rights is even possible between an "uneducated, uninformed consumer" and a large
corporate retailer. An extended discussion of the waiver problem, which undoubtedly
will become even more important in the future, is beyond the scope of this note.
46. See note 9 supra.
47. 407 U.S. at 102-03. The dissent's conclusion does not seem to follow from its
earlier arguments. Accepting the dissent's premise that Fuentes will have little impact
on creditor-debtor relations and will result in no substantial protections to the debtor, it
seems unlikely that the availability or cost of credit will be affected. If credit cost or
availability is affected, it probably will be because creditor repossessions are delayed,
which implies that the debtor has been provided some new protections, such as a
warning and delay before the repossession occurs.
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Fuentes in Lucas v. Stapp,48 decided a month before Fuentes. Relying
on Sniadach and Boddie v. Connecticut,49 the Washington appellate
court held that due process requires notice and an opportunity for a
hearing before a defendant's property can be seized by a local law
enforcement officer pursuant to a prejudgment writ of attachment.
Concluding that possession and use of an automobile is a property
interest which requires due process protections, the court found the
attachment statute unconstitutional for failing to provide for notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to seizure. In Seattle Credit Bu-
reau v. Hibbitt,50 decided one month after Fuentes, the Washington
Court of Appeals again held the attachment statute to be unconstitu-
tional, reiterating its holding in Lucas and rejecting the creditor's con-
tention that the debtor's automobile was not entitled to due process
protections because the creditor had a security interest in part of the
car.
5 1
In view of these recent due process decisions, various sections of
Washington's prejudgment seizure procedures appear to be unconsti-
tutional. Lucas and Hibbitt held R.C.W. § 7.12.020(1O),52 the most
commonly used section of the attachment statute, to be unconstitu-
tional. The constitutionality of other provisions of the attachment
statute is unclear. 53 Washington's replevin statute is virtually identical
to the Florida statute successfully challenged in Fuentes and thus
undoubtedly is unconstitutional. 54 Since the unconstitutionality of
parts of the attachment statute has a direct effect on Washington's
48. 6 Wn. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972).
49. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Boddie held that states are prohibited from denying access
to courts in divorce actions solely because of inability to pay costs.
50. 7 Wn. App. 219, 499 P.2d 92(1972).
51. Id. at 220-21, 499 P.2d at 93-94. The Washington appeals court rejected the
creditor's contention because: (I) the prejudgment writ of attachment was not applied
for on the basis of a specially protected interest, (2) the writ was not directed solely to
items in which there was a security interest, but to the entire vehicle, and (3) Fuentes
clarified that the situation presented was not truly unusual. Id.
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.020(10) (1959) provides that the plaintiff must allege
"that the object for which the action is brought is to recover on a contract, express or
implied."
53. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.020(1)-(9) (1959). Whether any of the remaining
nine situations allowing prejudgment attachment are constitutional depends upon
whether they qualify as "extraordinary" situations. See notes 57-74 and accompanying
text infra. *
54. See note 28 supra. A King County Superior Court decision held the Washington
replevin statute to be unconstitutional in April, 1972. See Funes & Oziel-World Furni-
ture, Inc. v. Sykes, No. 747025, Wash. Super. Ct., Chan. J. (April 1972), CCH 1972
POVERTY LAW REP. 16,132.
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garnishment statute,55 the recent due process decisions necessitate
a finding that the provisions for prejudgment garnishment of wages
and other property are also unconstitutional. 56 In revising these
three statutes, the Washington legislature must make some funda-
mental decisions.
II. "EXTRAORDINARY" SITUATIONS JUSTIFYING
SUMMARY SEIZURES OF PROPERTY
Since Fuentes permits prejudgment seizure of a defendant's prop-
erty without prior notice or hearing in "extraordinary" or "truly unu-
sual" situations, 57 the legislature may attempt to define a few limited
situations which will justify prejudgment seizure of a defendant's
property without notice and an opportunity to be heard. However,
any such legislative definition will face enormous constitutional prob-
lems. In contrast with an otherwise clearly written opinion, the Fuentes
definition of extraordinary situations is unclear and undoubtedly will
cause much confusion in the future. The only situation which is
clearly extraordinary involves prejudgment attachment to secure juris-
diction in a state court.58 Whatever the theoretical problems involved,
the practical problems inherent in adherence to Fuentes may make the
availability of the extraordinary situation exception illusory.59
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.33.010(I)(a) (Supp. 1972) provides for prejudgment gar-
nishment, "Where an original attachment has been issued in accordance with the statutes
in relation to attachments."
56. Id. § 7.33.010(1)(b) and (2). The conclusion that the provisions for prejudg-
ment garnishment of wages are unconstitutional had been reached earlier in 46 WASH.
L. REV. 423, 427-34 (1971), discussed in note 18 supra. Fuentes has made it clear that
the ban on prejudgment seizures without notice and an opportunity to be heard applies
to property other than wages. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra.
57. "There are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 379. These situations, however,
must be truly unusual." Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90. See also Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339.
58. In discussing extraordinary situations, both Sniadach and Fuentes cited Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), which upheld a state statute allowing attachment of a
nonresident's property to obtain jurisdiction in a state court. But other language in
Sniadach suggests that when personal jurisdiction is possible either because a nonresi-
dent is present in the state, or because a long-arm statute is available, prejudgment at-
tachment of a nonresident's property to obtain jurisdiction may not be justifiable. ("Pe-
titioner was a resident of Wisconsin and in personam jurisdiction was readily obtain-
able." 395 U.S. at 339). See also 46 WASH. L. REV. 423, 428-29 (1971). Contra, Banks v.
Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 143, 102 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1972); Property Research Fin.
Corp. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972). If a nonresident
defendant appears and submits to the jurisdiction of a state court, it is uncertain whether
the attachment must be dissolved pending trial and judgment.
59. For a discussion of the practical problems involved, see notes 71-74 and accom-
panying text infra.
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The Fuentes Court listed a few limited situations in which summary
seizure of property without notice and an opportunity for a prior
hearing had been upheld,60 noting that in each situation the following
three elements were present: (1) a necessity for seizure to secure an
important governmental or general public interest, (2) a special need
for very prompt action, and (3) strict state control by an official acting
under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute insuring that seizure
is necessary and justifiable in the particular instance.61 Applying this
test to the facts of Fuentes, the Court concluded that none of the three
criteria was present. 62
The three-pronged Fuentes test apparently was intended to provide
the method by which courts can determine whether an extraordinary
situation exists. But two important questions immediately arise: (1)
Does the Fuentes test apply to attachment and garnishment as well as
to replevin? (2) To find that an extraordinary situation exists, is it
necessary that all three criteria are met, or is the presence of any one
of the three criteria sufficient?
The answer to the first question appears to be yes, the Fuentes ex-
traordinary situation test logically should apply to attachment and
garnishment as well as to replevin. The three criteria used in Fuentes
ostensibly were drawn from a series of cases involving summary sei-
zure of property by government officials acting in the public interest,
60. 407 U.S. at 91-92. The opinion specified that summary seizure of property has
been allowed to collect revenue for the United States, Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931); to meet the needs of a national war effort, United States v.
Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 553 (1921), Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 245 (1921), Central
Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 556 (1921); to protect against the economic
disaster of a bank failure, Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); and to protect the
public from misbranded drugs, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594
(1950), and contaminated food, North American Cold Storage v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908).
61. 407 U.S. at 91-92.
62. Applying the first criterion to the facts of Fuentes, the Court stated that "pre-
judgment replevin statutes serve no such important governmental or general public in-
terest. They allow summary seizure of a person's possessions when no more than private
gain is at stake." Id. at 92. In analyzing the second criterion, the Court stated: "There
may be cases in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a
debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods," id. at 93, but found no such situation
present in Fuentes. In discussing the third criterion, the Court noted that a major
problem in ensuring necessary and justifiable state action is determining whether the
creditor's allegations are true: "The statutes, moreover, abdicate effective state control
over state power. Private parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally
invoke state power to replevy goods from another. . . . The State acts largely in the
dark." Id.
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not at the behest of and for the benefit of a private party.63 In a foot-
note, the Fuentes opinion distinguished between governmental seizure
situations on the one hand and attachment and garnishment on the
other.64 This distinction is clearly a viable one. However, in the text of
the opinion, the Court proceeded to apply the three criteria test to the
facts of Fuentes, a private replevin situation. 65 While the propriety of
applying a test derived from governmental seizure cases to prejudg-
ment seizure in a private creditor-debtor context is debatable, once
the application is made, it is difficult to draw a meaningful line be-
tween replevin and attachment, especially from the debtor's point of
VieW.6 6
The answer to the second question is uncertain. When the Court
concluded that none of the three criteria was present in the facts of
Fuentes,67 it gave no hint as to whether the presence of one criterion
would have been sufficient to label the situation extraordinary or
whether all three were necessary. In a footnote discussing two prior
cases in which the Court upheld summary attachment of a defendant's
property, the Court reiterated the correctness of the earlier holdings
and pointed to the presence of only one of the three criteria, the ne-
cessity of seizure to secure an important governmental interest. 68
63. See the cases listed in note 60 supra.
64. Fuentes labelled governmental seizure situations as "outright seizure." The foot-
note stated, "Of course, outright seizure of property is not the only kind of deprivation
that must be preceded by a prior hearing [citing Sniadach (garnishment)]. In three
cases, the Court has allowed the attachment of property without a prior hearing." 407
U.S. at 91 n.23.
65. Id. at 92-93.
66. To an "uneducated, uninformed" defendant, it matters not whether his property
is being attached, garnished, replevied, or seized by the government: the result is the
same-loss of personal property without notice and a hearing. The Fuentes majority
seemed to adopt the debtor's viewpoint: "Procedural due process is not intended to
promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the
particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken." Id. at 90
n.22.
From the creditor's perspective, there are important differences between the two pro-
cedures. For example, in a prejudgment replevin proceeding, the creditor usually can
obtain possession of the property seventy-two hours after levy, see note 16 supra, while
in attachment situations the sheriff holds the property pending a default judgment or the
outcome of later proceedings. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.12.090 (1959).
67. See note 62 supra.
68. The Court cited Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), which in-
volved action by a state official against stockholders of a defunct bank, and stated: "The
attachment was necessary to protect the public against the same sort of harm involved in
the seizure cases-a bank failure." 407 U.S. at 91 n.23. The Court also cited Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), supra note 58, and stated that attachment of a non-
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However, in a later footnote the Court applied all three criteria to a
search warrant situation, found all three present, and concluded, in
short, that an application for a search warrant is an extraordinary sit-
uation.69
If all three criteria must be met, creditors will have the difficult
burden of proving that important general public interests are involved
in prejudgment seizure proceedings. In view of certain language in
Fuentes,70 this could be very difficult. Moreover, if all three criteria
must be met before an extraordinary situation exists, the majority
perhaps indulged in due process overkill. Given that extraordinary
situations allow seizure of a defendant's property without notice and a
hearing, it was logical for the Fuentes Court to attempt to establish
alternative standards to protect the defendant's interests, but it should
not have been necessary to provide the defendant with more protec-
tion than due process normally affords. Reduced to its simplest terms,
due process provides a debtor with two protections-notice and an
opportunity to be heard before a deprivation of property occurs. The
purpose of the notice and hearing is not to determine if the seizure is
necessary to secure an important governmental interest, or even to
establish that there is a special need for very prompt action; rather it
"is to protect [the debtor's] use and possession of property from arbi-
trary encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken
deprivations of property."7' Hence, it would seem more appropriate
to require that an extraordinary situation statute authorizing prejudg-
ment seizure of property without notice and a hearing to the debtor
meet only the third of the Fuentes criteria, requiring strict state con-
trol by an official acting pursuant to narrowly drawn standards to
ensure that the seizure is necessary and justifiable in the particular in-
stance.
resident's property to obtain jurisdiction in a state court is "clearly a most basic and
important general public interest." Id. The Fuentes Court limited a third prejudgment
attachment case, McKay v. Mclnnes, 297 U.S. 820 (1929), to propositions consistent
with the two earlier cases. Id.
69. 407 U.S. at 93-94 n.30.
70. See note 62 supra. Possible creditor arguments include: "the promotion of the
economy through generous extension of credit and the assurance that valid debts will be
paid, the provision of a practical method of protecting a wronged party, and the conser-
vation of judicial resources." Comment, Prejudgment Replevin and Self-help
Repossession-Creditor Remedies of the Past: A Constitutional Plan of Assault, 17 ST.
Louis L.J. 127, 135 (1972).
71. 407U.S.at8l.
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Regardless of whether one or all of the Fuentes criteria must be
present, as a practical matter creditors may find it impossible to con-
vince a court that an extraordinary situation exists based solely on the
creditor's allegations. Speaking of the virtues of a hearing before sei-
zure, the Court stated: "Because of the understandable, self-interested
fallability of litigants, a court does not decide a dispute until it has
had an opportunity to hear both sides-and does not generally take
even tentative action until it has itself examined the support for the
plaintiff's position. ' 72 The Fuentes Court seemed very reluctant to be-
lieve a creditor's claim that the situation is extraordinary without first
requiring a hearing to determine the validity of the creditor's allega-
tion.73 If the factual evaluation of whether an extraordinary situation
exists in the particular instance must be made solely on the basis of
the creditor's allegations, without input from the debtor, the determi-
nation of whether such a procedure is constitutional may depend
again on the court's opinion of creditor reliability. Pragmatically, the
problem of controlling creditor abuse of extraordinary situation provi-
sions may be insurmountable.7 4 Since the goal of protecting a debtor's
use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment may be
impossible to attain without requiring prior notice and hearing, the
72. Id. at 83.
73. The majority and the dissent in Fuentes had sharply contrasting opinions as to
creditor reliability. The dissent assumed that the creditors usually act in good faith and
that the determination of the creditor's claim is typically a simple default/no default
evaluation. Justice White, writing for the dissent, stated:
EM] uch depends on one's perceptions of the practical considerations in-
volved.... But in these typical situations, the buyer-debtor has either defaulted or
he has not. . . .If there is a default, it would seem not only "fair," but essential
that the creditor be allowed to repossess; and I cannot say that the likelihood of a
mistaken claim is sufficiently real or recurring to justify a broad constitutional
requirement. . . .I could be quite wrong, but it would not seem in the creditor's
interest for a default occasioning repossession to occur ...
Id. at 100.
The majority was unwilling to make those assumptions. In a footnote, discussed in
note 32 supra, the majority asserted that a creditor dealing with a low income, unedu-
cated consumer "may feel that he can act with impunity." Id. at 83 n.13.
74. Practicalities dictate that such creditor abuse rarely would be discovered. Sup-
pose that pursuant to a narrowly drawn extraordinary situation statute, a creditor
falsely alleged that a debtor was absconding and had the debtor's property seized. Un-
less the debtor had a valid defense to the underlying debt or legal advice as to the ille-
gality of the prejudgment seizure, he probably would fail to seek a return of his prop-
erty. Even if he did demand damages for the wrongful taking of his property, the
measure of damages would be the loss of a few days' use of the property, a negligible
amount. In the absence of a statutory authorization for punitive damages, creditors
would be sorely tempted to falsely allege extraordinary situations because of the small
chance of discovery and the trivial nature of the damages involved.
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result may well be that no situation involving private creditors and
debtors can qualify as an extraordinary situation, regardless of how
many of the Fuentes criteria are applied.
IV. COMMONPLACE SITUATIONS
Regardless of the availability of extraordinary situations which jus-
tify seizure of a defendant's property without notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing, the question remains as to whether prejudgment
attachment, garnishment, or replevin procedures should be available
to the plaintiff creditor in commonplace situations. Fuentes mandates
that such prejudgment seizure proceedings must meet due process
requirements. If the legislature decides to provide for such proceed-
ings, it must specify what kind of an opportunity to be heard is re-
quired. The Fuentes Court listed several factors which might affect
the form of the hearing without affecting the requirement for a
hearing. These are: (1) the simplicity of the issues,75 (2) the length of
time of the deprivation,76 (3) the relative weight of liberty or property
interests involved,77 and (4) the nature of the subsequent proceed-
ings.78
A. The Scope of the Required Hearing
While the Fuentes majority recognized that the nature and form of
the required hearing are subject to "many potential variations" in leg-
islative definition, the Court reiterated:79
[I]t is axiomatic that the hearing must provide a real test. "[D]ue
process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which
are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity,
of the underlying claim before he can be deprived of his prop-
erty. . ....
This standard would appear to be met by a probable cause hearing.80
75. 407 U.S. at 87 n. 18 (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65 (1972)).
76. Id. at 86.
77. Id. at 90 n.21 (citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378).
78. Id. at 82 (citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378).
79. Id. at 97 (quoting Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
80. The dissent interpreted the majority's holding as follows: "The Court holds it
constitutionally essential to afford opportunity for a probable cause hearing prior to
repossession." Id. at 100.
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Fuentes implied that even if a debtor raises no defense to the creditor's
claim, there is a dispute to be resolved at the hearing-whether or not
the creditor can establish that the debtor has defaulted and thereby
lost his right to possession and use of the property.81
Whatever the label given the hearing, the court may be forced to
take a detailed look at the merits of the underlying suit. In the excep-
tional situation where the defendant either denies the claim or
affirmatively offers a defense, a fairly comprehensive hearing may be
necessary. If factual matters are in dispute, it may be necessary to call
witnesses for both sides. If questions of law are involved, the issues
presented may require briefs and oral* argument at the hearing. If the
hearing is to fulfill the constitutional mandate, it may of necessity
approach in complexity and length a full trial on the merits.
B. The Timing of the Required Hearing
The object of a prejudgment writ of attachment, garnishment, or
replevin is to seize a defendant's property prior to the time judgment is
entered on the underlying suit. Depending on the circumstances, judg-
ment may be entered at times ranging from twenty days to several
years after service of summons and complaint.8 2 Obviously, the deci-
sion to institute prejudgment procedures is influenced by the length of
the anticipated delay before judgment; the timing of the prejudgment
hearing also should be influenced by the anticipated delay before
judgment. Since many defendants will default,8 3 the plaintiff often has
only a twenty- to thirty-day wait before judgment is entered because
a default judgment can be entered shortly after the expiration of the
time period allowed for answer.8 4 Oncejudgment is entered, the creditor
will have the full range of available remedies and the defendant's
81. Id. at 87 n.17.
82. Washington has a twenty-day answer period in superior court, and a six- to
twenty-day answer period injustice court. WASH. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 4(a); WAsh. DIST.
J. CT. (Civ.) R. 4(b).
83. Fuentes suggested that many defendants will default and made it clear that due
process is satisfied by only an opportunity to be heard: "And, of course, no hearing need
be held unless the defendant, having received notice of his opportunity, takes advantage
of it." 407 U.S. at 92-93 n.29.
A four year study of creditor-debtor relations concluded that in the three cities
studied (Chicago, Detroit, and New York), creditors obtained default judgments against
debtors in over 90% of all cases filed. See D. CAPLOVITZ, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 11-66
(1971).
84. See WASH. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 55(a) and (b); WASH. DIST. J. CT. (Civ.) R. 55(a).
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property can be executed upon or garnished without further notice or
opportunity for a hearing. 85
A provision authorizing the required prejudgment hearing prior to
the expiration of the twenty-day answer period is difficult to justify.
Assuming that a defendant who will default in the underlying action
also will not appear for the prejudgment hearing, it is difficult to see
how a few days' or weeks' difference in the availability of remedies to
the plaintiff can offset the additional expense incurred by the court
system. To take full advantage of the high rate of defaulting defend-
ants, it is logical to delay the time of the prejudgment hearing until
after the answer period has expired. If the defendant defaults, a pre-
judgment writ is not necessary. If the defendant answers and a delay
of some length is anticipated before trial, a prejudgment hearing pro-
cedure becomes more practical.
C. Should Prejudgment Seizure Proceedings Continue to be
Supplemental?
At present, prejudgment attachment, garnishment, and replevin are
supplemental procedures. 86 Given the newly clarified due process re-
quirements, a look at whether such potentially expeditious seizure
procedures should be independent actions is in order. In such a re-
evaluation, it is helpful to separate replevin from attachment and gar-
nishment. The purpose of replevin is to seek return of particular prop-
erty, and a prejudgment writ of replevin merely seeks an early return
of the property. Secured creditors can use replevin to obtain posses-
sion of the collateral after default.87 In contrast, the usual purpose of
attachment or garnishment prior to judgment is to obtain security for
the satisfaction of a future judgment, and not to secure the return of
particular property.
A solution to the secured creditor's need to obtain prompt posses-
sion of the particular collateral after default while still safeguarding a
85. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 6.04 (1959) and § 7.33.010(1)(c) (1969).
86. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
87. Holders of an Article 9 security interest may bring an action in replevin to re-
cover possession of the collateral. See Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other than Real
Estate Mortgages)--A Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Pre-Code
Washington Law in COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN WASH-
INGTON 638, 733 (1967).
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debtor's due process rights is to adopt a special statute similar in oper-
ation to the unlawful detainer statute,88 which would facilitate a
prompt judicial settlement of conflicting claims in particular property.
For example, the statute could provide for a twelve-day answer period
after service of summons and complaint to be followed by a judicial
hearing to determine final entitlement to possession of the property.89
Such a statute would provide for a prompt and permanent adjudica-
tion of the right to possession of particular personal property by elimi-
nating the need for both a probable cause hearing and a later trial on
88. The unlawful detainer statute is codified in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 59.12 (1959).
The summons issued pursuant to the statute is returnable not less than six nor more than
twelve days from the date of service. Id. § 59.12.070. The issue of the constitutionality
of expedited hearings in real property situations recently has been before the United
States Supreme Court. In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court upheld the
Oregon unlawful detainer statute, ORE. REV. CODE § 105.105-.160 (1971), which
provides that ten days after a tenant's rent is due, a landlord may bring an action for
possession of the real property by giving the tenant not less than two nor more than four
days' notice before the hearing. The hearing itself is of extremely limited scope; the
tenant cannot raise a defense such as failure to maintain the property, and the landlbid
cannot seek back rent. See the brief discussion of Lindsey in Note, Fuentes v. Shevin:
An End to the Misuse of Replevin, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 312, 317-18 (1972).
89. Of course, a number of problems would arise with the adoption of an expedited
replevin statute. Two are of immediate importance: (1) Would a secured party have a
right to both expedited replevin and a deficiency judgment? (2) Would the outcome of
the replevin proceeding be res judicata as to the in personam action on the underlying
debt? At present a secured creditor who repossesses the collateral through a replevin
proceeding is not barred from also obtaining a deficiency judgment. Although a unique
Washington amendment to the UCC, WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-501(1)(1967), prohibits
both repossession and a deficiency judgment "in the case of a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods," this anti-deficiency judgment prohibition has been inter-
preted to apply only to private repossessions. If a secured party repossesses the collat-
eral through court action in a replevin proceeding, the secured creditor may still sue the
debtor in personam for a deficiency judgment. See Wing Ott Lew v. Goodfellow
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 6 Wn. App. 226, 231, 492 P.2d 258, 262 (1971), quoting
W. SHATTuCK & R. CoswAY, 8 WASH. PaAC. § 9:1270 (5) (1967). To prohibit deficiency
judgments in both private repossession and replevin situations, or to extend the defi-
ciency judgment prohibition to all consumer goods or to any situation in which a cred-
itor uses the expedited replevin proceeding regardless of the nature of the property, it
would seem necessary to spell out the full scope of the prohibition in both the new re-
plevin statute and in WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-501(1) (1967).
If the outcome of the special replevin proceeding is res judicata to the underlying
debt, and if the legislature decides to allow for deficiency judgments, it would be most
efficient to allow for entry of a deficiency judgment in connection with the replevin pro-
ceeding. Such a result would mean that secured creditors who use the special replevin
statute would be able to obtain both repossession of the collateral and a deficiency judg-
ment very quickly, which would be a substantial advantage over unsecured creditors
who would not have access to the special replevin proceeding. If the legislature wishes to
avoid such inequality of remedies available to secured and unsecured creditors, it could
either deny secured creditors both prompt repossession and a deficiency judgment by
forcing them to choose between the two, or provide for an expedited prejudgment
hearing procedure in attachment and garnishment situations, which could result in a
substantial increase in the workload of the courts.
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the merits after a potentially lengthy delay. This type of procedure
would be especially justified where the particular property is perish-
able or subject to rapid deterioration in value.90 Moreover, a provi-
sion for a speedy determination of the right to possession of personal
property could have the beneficial effect of keeping consumer credit
costs at a minimum; by eliminating the need for two hearings, the
special statute also could minimize the workload of the courts. The
arguments in favor of a similar statute for attachment and garnish-
ment procedures appear less strong, however, because these situations
usually do not involve a pressing need for the return of particular
property.91
D. Should There Be Prejudgment Seizures of Property?
There is little doubt that Fuentes improved the position of the
debtor vis-a-vis the creditor. No longer will a defendant be startled by
a deputy sheriff's appearance without warning to take possession of
the family automobile or stove.92 The requirement of notice and an
opportunity to be heard gives even the defaulting debtor a warning
and short delay before the judicial repossession occurs. Fuentes repre-
sents a major inroad on one of the most awesome of the creditor's
weapons-leverage. But even with the due process safeguards, is it in
the public interest to authorize prejudgment seizures of property?
From the creditor's standpoint, it is uncertain that the advantage of
reaching the defendant's property prior to judgment will merit the
90. Rapid deterioration is not necessarily measured in terms of days. For example,
an automobile left in the debtor's possession may depreciate significantly over the
course of a year's delay before trial in a replevin action. Because prejudgment writs of
replevin without notice and an opportunity to be heard to the defendant are unconstitu-
tional, unless a creditor relies on a private self-help repossession, which may itself be
unconstitutional (see note 9 supra), a year's delay may be common in nondefault situa-
tions.
91. Unsecured creditors are less likely to have placed reliance on the ability to ob-
tain possession of particular property; their motives in seizing a defendant's property
more often are to obtain security, ensure lien priority in bankruptcy, or acquire lev-
erage over the defendant. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. A provision for
one prompt, final hearing to determine all claims between the two parties would mean
that complicated lawsuits in which the plaintiffsought attachment merely to obtain secu-
rity, for example, would be brought before the court for a final adjudication only days
after suit was filed. A large backlog would almost certainly develop. Unsecured credi-
tors would be better advised to lobby for a prejudgment hearing procedure.
92. However, debtors still have no certain protection against a private repossession
of the family automobile without warning. See note 9 supra.
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expense involved in initiating and participating in the required pre-
judgment hearing. If the defendant is going to default, the creditor
will have only a twenty to thirty day wait until judgment is entered,
and a prejudgment seizure proceeding should be unnecessary.93
Elimination of prejudgment seizure proceedings would mean that
creditors no longer would be able to obtain security for satisfaction of
a future judgment or secure an early lien for purposes of bankruptcy.
Because of the delay involved before entry of judgment in contested
cases and because the date of the lien for bankruptcy purposes will
run from the date of judgment, unsecured creditors might be more
hesitant to sue a potentially insolvent debtor.9 4 This could have the bene-
ficial effect of ending to some degree the race to the courts between
unsecured creditors, which in turn might decrease the number of bank-
ruptcies and increase the frequency of composition agreements or
voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors.9 5 If a special re-
plevin statute, as proposed above, is adopted, secured creditors still
could prevent damage or deterioration to property in a debtor's pos-
session subject to only a slight delay.
From the debtor's standpoint, total elimination of prejudgment sei-
zure proceedings appears to be beneficial, unless it results in a greater
increase in consumer credit costs than would retention of prejudgment
seizure proceedings. Unless a loosely drafted or poorly supervised ex-
traordinary situation provision is adopted, creditors would no longer
be able to obtain even minimal leverage against debtors by having a
sheriff seize property while a full trial on the merits is pending. Fi-
nally, any statutory provision for a hearing would increase the work-
load of the courts which could result in additional delays before either
the prejudgment hearing or the full trial on the underlying suit is held.
93. A recent article analyzing creditor's remedies in New York in light of Fuentes
concluded that in most instances it would be far more practical for a creditor to
abandon use of prejudgment procedures and to rely solely on post-judgment remedies,
especially if certain proposed statutory amendments were adopted. See Gardner,
Fuentes v. Shevin: The New York Creditor and Replevin, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 17, 37-41
(1972).
94. Because the unsecured creditor could still levy execution on the debtor's prop-
erty after only a short delay if the defendant defaults in the court action, the hesitation to
sue should not be overestimated.
95. Commentators have urged such a result. See, e.g., W. PHILLIPS, PHILLIPS'
NADLER, THE LAW OF DEBTOR RELIEF § 4 (2d ed. 1972): "Running the 'Race of Dili-
gence' may receive legal sanction, but creates inequitable and wasteful results....
[C] reditors have nonetheless learned that 'when financial embarrassment begins, the
surest way to make failure certain is by individual collection. " (footnotes omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Washington's attachment, garnishment, and replevin statutes are
unconstitutional insofar as they provide for prejudgment seizure of
property without allowing the defendant prior notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. Although the scope of "extraordinary" situations
which justify summary seizure of property is unclear, it probably is
limited to attachment of a nonresident's property where necessary to
obtain jurisdiction in a state court. The scope and timing of the re-
quired hearing prior to issuance of a prejudgment writ in common-
place situations requires legislative definition. A probable cause type
hearing seems necessary, and it would seem sensible to schedule the
time of the hearing after the expiration of the answer period in order
to take full advantage of the high rate of nonappearing defendants.
The secured creditor's need to obtain prompt return of the collat-
eral after default on the underlying obligation could be satisfied by
adopting a special replevin statute, similar to the unlawful detainer
statute, to provide for rapid settlement in one prompt hearing of con-
flicting claims in personal property. Finally, in non replevin situations,
given the increased workload for the courts, the minimal savings to
the creditor, and the potential detriment to the debtor, it is question-
able whether the public interest is served by authorizing prejudgment
seizure of property even after notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
P.A.G.
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